

# TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

## AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

1942

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### I.—Caesar and the Roman Nobility<sup>1</sup>

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For the generation which has read *Mein Kampf* and has seen Hitler's ruthless execution of the designs for domination and world conquest of which he provided a blue print long in advance, the rise of a dictator to power has a peculiar fascination. Hence the great revival of interest in the career of Napoleon who as a foreigner in the land of his adoption shows in his swift course of conquest remarkable parallels with Hitler. The career of Caesar has attracted less attention first because the modern Caesar, strutting in the Palazzo Venezia before the bust of the great dictator, has made such a poor showing that the prestige of his prototype is in a sense lowered, and second because Caesar's empire, most of it already conquered by his predecessors, did not, like Napoleon's, fall apart after Caesar's death but endured for several hundred years. A study of Caesar does not give us the hope of liberation that we can secure from rereading, as many of us have since Hitler's invasion of Russia, the story of Napoleon's failure in the vivid pages of *War and Peace*.

[Presidential address prepared for the meeting of the American Philological Association at Cincinnati, which was cancelled on account of the demands of the war.]

<sup>1</sup> I have not ventured to publish this paper without some documentation. For the first part much of the evidence is cited in my papers, "Caesar's Early Career," *CPh* 36 (1941) 113-132, and "Caesar's Colleagues in the Pontifical College," *AJPh* 63 (1942) 385-412. Ancient references for well-attested facts in the lives of the men referred to can be found in the biographical articles in the *Real-Encyclopaedie* and in Drumann-Groebe, *Römische Geschichte*. I have not attempted to give full references to modern authorities, but I should like to record my obligation to the recent work of Syme and Strasburger cited in the paper.

Yet, though Hitler might say of Caesar, as Caesar said of Sulla, that he did not understand the ABC of dictatorship, Caesar is of interest today because he too had his Kampf—a constant struggle that had been going on some twenty years before he led his conquering legions across the Rubicon. Although Caesar has provided us with no blue print for his plans, he has in one passage of the *Bellum Civile* (1.22) described his struggle in words that provide some indication of his long-term aims. He has led his army out of the province, he says, ut se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret—to secure the freedom of himself and the Roman people who had been overwhelmed by a faction of oligarchs. Almost the same terminology can be found in one of the letters written by Sallust as advice to Caesar in the organization of his new order, and a similar phrase is used by Augustus in the *Res Gestae* to describe the reconstituted faction of nobles who murdered Caesar.<sup>2</sup> The words echo the language of generations of tribunes of the people. The *factio paucorum* was the clique that represented the remnants of the oligarchy entrenched in power by Sulla. Against that clique Caesar had waged political warfare for many years before he appealed to his army and marched into Italy.

However we decide the much discussed question of Caesar's aims for personal domination and a new order, whether we hold with Mommsen<sup>3</sup> that "the rapidity and self-precision with which his plan was executed prove that it had long been meditated thoroughly, and all its parts settled in detail," or whether we agree with other historians that Caesar was an ambitious opportunist, able with swift decision to seize the right moment and win supremacy over his adversaries, we cannot doubt that Caesar's chief aim throughout a long period was victory over strong elements in the aristocracy. Mommsen has portrayed the struggle unforgettably in pages filled with his own experience in the revolution of 1848. He identifies the aristocracy with the hated Prussian Junkers, and Caesar with the ideal of the constitutional monarch who was to save Rome—and Prussia—from the depredations of the oligarchs.

A new view of the struggle is presented by Syme's significant book, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939). Syme is interested

<sup>2</sup> Sall. *De Rep.* 2.2.4; Augustus *R.G.* 1.1–2. Cf. Hirtius *B.G.* 8.50.2. See Strasburger s.v. "Optimates" *RE* 788f.

<sup>3</sup> *History of Rome*, translated by W. P. Dickson 5 (1900) 442.

in the nobility as a whole rather than in the small group—Caesar, Pompey, Crassus, Cato—on whom other historians have centered their attention. Syme has shown not only the power of Caesar's enemies but the strength of the elements in the aristocracy which aided Caesar in his rise to power. He is concerned particularly with the party alignments in the nobility from the year 60, the fateful consulship of Metellus, when Caesar entered into the famous political ring known in modern times under the misleading term "first triumvirate"—a faction of three political leaders that was to lead inevitably to armed conflict:

Iudumque Fortunae gravisque  
principum amicitias et arma.

My object in this paper is to consider Caesar's political associations before that time—to determine who were his friends and who were his enemies in the period of intense party strife that led up to the "triumvirate." I shall confine the discussion to the nobility, the upper crust of the senate represented by the families whose members had reached the consulship.

The faction of the year 60, formed to secure the objectives of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, followed a tradition that had long been known in Roman politics.<sup>4</sup> Such deals were essentially personal and temporary in character and were usually looked upon as rather disreputable. But the faction was the only substitute the Romans had for the political party with a program. It is a mistake to describe the political strife of the late republic as a contest between an *optimatus* or senatorial and a popular or democratic party.<sup>5</sup> The terms *optimates* and *populares* are designations not so much of political parties as of methods pursued by the extreme right and left in the senate. One group, the self-styled *graves*, the serious good men—*boni* or *optimates*—gained their ends by upholding the authority of the senate, while the other, dubbed *populares* and accused by the good men of *levitas*, appealed through the tribunate to the popular assembly, and, asserting, as Caesar did, that they were liberating the people from slavery to a small group, frequently overrode the senatorial majority. In claiming to uphold the prestige of the senate or the rights of the people, both groups were using

<sup>4</sup> See Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der röm. Republik* (Berlin, 1912) 102ff.

<sup>5</sup> Strasburger, *op. cit.* 775ff., has traced to eighteenth century British historians the attribution of a two party system to Rome.

pretexts to conceal their own ambition: pro sua quisque potentia certabant.<sup>6</sup> From time to time factions of the extreme right and left that might be called *optimates* and *populares* were formed, but until the late republic the groups were not closely organized. Especially among the *populares* there were often divergent aims.<sup>7</sup> Moreover men were constantly shifting their allegiance and their methods of obtaining power. Some senators, like the orator Crassus and the new man Cicero, followed a popular course in their early careers and acted as *optimates* after they had reached high position. Opportunists like the elder Curio veered from one side to the other. Always there was a group of senators who were reluctant to attach their fortunes to the right or the left. When party strife led to civil war, as it did in the period of Marius and Sulla and again in the time of Caesar and Pompey, a large section of this middle group held aloof from armed conflict and hoped for a peaceful solution.

From Caesar's twelfth to his eighteenth year his immediate branch of the patrician Julii was involved in factional and civil strife on the side of Marius and of Cinna. Caesar's aunt was the wife of Marius and Caesar himself at the age of sixteen married Cinna's daughter. Marius was a great *popularis* and, although he had many nobles besides Caesar's family among his partisans, the strongest elements in the aristocracy were arrayed against him in supporting Sulla. When Sulla as leader of the conservatives was victorious late in 82, most of Caesar's early associates were either slain in the proscriptions or enrolled in the despoiled class known as the sons of the proscribed, who were deprived of their inheritance and of the right to hold office. Caesar escaped their fate because Marius and Cinna had had him nominated for the post of *flamen Dialis*, priest of Jupiter, who lived surrounded with taboos that made military service impossible. Caesar had not been inaugurated in the priesthood, but in conformity with the rules for the *flamen* he seems to have refrained from taking any part in the armed conflict of the years 84-2.

<sup>6</sup> Sall. *Catil.* 38.3; cf. *Hist.* 1.12; *Iug.* 41-2.

<sup>7</sup> On the terminology used for party associations see Strasburger *op. cit.* The *factio* belonged properly to the aristocracy (cf. Cic. *Rep.* 3.23); a popular faction is referred to only by Valerius Maximus (4.1.13, *populari factione*). Cf. Livy 3.39.9. Caesar's enemies are described by Sallust as *factio nobilitatis* (*De Rep.* 2.2.4; 2.8.6) or as *nobiles* (2.6.1; 2.11.6); by Suetonius as *factio* or *conspiratio optimatum* (*Iul.* 11 and 15) or as *optimates* (19). On the designation of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus as *populares* in 59 see note 51.

Sulla not only saved Caesar's life; he also saved the young man from the priesthood to which the Marians had wished to dedicate him. Sulla seems even to have had special plans for Caesar. In his design for oligarchic rule he needed a nucleus of younger men, and he particularly desired recruits from the vanishing patrician class to which he himself belonged. His designs for Caesar are shown by the fact that he ordered the youth to divorce Cinna's daughter, doubtless planning to marry him, as he did Pompey, to some one of prominence in the new regime. But Caesar, unlike Pompey and other nobles, refused, and roused the ire of Sulla by his loyalty to his wife. Caesar's life was then in danger and he was saved only because, as is usually true in civil war, family lines were crossed between the two sides, and he had among the Sullan supporters influential relatives of his mother, C. Aurelius Cotta and Mamercus Aemilius Lepidus, to plead for him.<sup>8</sup>

Thus Caesar escaped from Sulla and from Sulla's even more vindictive agents. Thinking, no doubt, that absence from Italy was desirable in the time of reorganization, he departed to the East to begin his military service under two Sullan officers.<sup>9</sup> This, it may be noted, was not the only choice that lay open to him. Former Marian supporters who had escaped from the proscriptions were gathering in Africa and Spain for service under the great soldier Sertorius who was to keep the Roman world in terror for almost a decade. Caesar's decision to seek his fortune under Sullan commanders is a clear indication that he was compromising in order to rise in the Sullan state.

Caesar was absent from Rome while Sulla was reorganizing the constitution, establishing the rule of the senate, restoring the juries to the senators, abolishing the censorship, and depriving the tribunate, the chief instrument of the *populares*, of its most essential powers. The tribunes lost the right to initiate legislation, and to

<sup>8</sup> The three Cotta brothers, Gaius, Marcus, and Lucius, consuls of 75, 74, and 65, seem to have been Caesar's cousins and not, as is usually believed, his uncles. Cf. Münzer, *Röm. Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart, 1920), 312f., 326f. The oldest brother, who aided Caesar on this occasion, is described as *ex factione media* (Sall. *Hist.* 3.48.8 Maur.). The youngest brother, who as praetor in 70 proposed the law which reformed the public courts, joined Caesar in the Civil War and was by report active in a plan to have Caesar declared king of the subject people (Suet. *Iul.* 79).

<sup>9</sup> Caesar began his military service under M. Minucius Thermus who was praetorian governor of Asia in 81. Later Caesar served for a brief time under P. Servilius Vatia in his Isaurian campaign.

institute prosecutions, and the office was weakened by the fact that tribunes were debarred from candidacy for higher office. Caesar was still absent when Sulla made his remarkable renunciation, departed for his Campanian estate to live a life of leisure, and left the entrenched nobility to the full direction of a state that was supposedly free from the old dangers of revolution.

The dangers were not all removed, for Sulla's constitution in reviving the courts and the free exercise of election, both of which had been partially paralyzed under the rule of the so-called democrats, had provided free scope for factional strife. Under the new senatorial juries the prosecutions, which had been a regular feature of Roman party contests, returned to the courts. Indeed the increase in the number of courts gave additional opportunity for such attacks, and great chance to the young man to make himself known to the electorate by acting as prosecutor in suits for extortion or bribery or violence. When the elections were restored to their former freedom, cliques and factions speedily formed again. Even before Sulla's withdrawal a clique of nobles centering about the brilliant young general Pompey supported for the consulship M. Aemilius Lepidus, a man whose revolutionary tendencies Sulla recognized.<sup>10</sup> But though he warned Pompey, Sulla took no steps to prevent the election, and Lepidus was returned with more votes than his colleague, Q. Lutatius Catulus, whom Sulla called the best of all his followers.

As consul Lepidus became the leader of a faction that eventually included in its plans the restoration of the tribunate and the recall of the Marian exiles. He waited until after the death of Sulla to move toward open revolution. Then he began to seek aid far and wide, especially among the former Marians, many of whom were fighting with Sertorius in Spain. Through representatives he made overtures to Caesar, who at the news of Sulla's death had abandoned his military career and returned to Rome. But Caesar distrusted Lepidus and would have nothing to do with the revolt. It is noteworthy that Pompey, who had supported Lepidus for the consulship, remained true to the senate when Lepidus came to the point of armed action, and, leading an army against the revolutionaries,

<sup>10</sup> The effort of Carcopino, *Sulla ou la Monarchie manquée* (Paris, 1931), to explain Sulla's withdrawal by the suggestion that a faction of nobles led by Pompey was too strong for him is unconvincing. Sulla's constitution was designed to secure not his own personal domination but the supremacy of the nobility.

put down the revolt. In the light of Caesar's subsequent association with Pompey, it is possible that Pompey's opposition to Lepidus' revolt had something to do with Caesar's decision to avoid all contact with Lepidus.

During the two years that Caesar spent in Rome at this time we have only two records of his activity, and both of them have frequently been cited as evidence that he was already beginning the vigorous opposition to the Sullan constitution which was to occupy his energies in subsequent years. Caesar accused the consular Dolabella of extortion in his governorship of Macedonia and he appeared in a civil case as counsel for the Greeks who were bringing suit against the Sullan officer C. Antonius. But, as has already been pointed out, Sulla had not meant under his constitution to take from the nobility the political weapon of the public trial or to deprive the young aspirant for office of the opportunity to make himself known by prosecutions and defences. He had left intact a cherished tradition of the oligarchy. Other young nobles of staunch Sullan background were following a similar course in this period.<sup>11</sup> Caesar's suit was less successful than some of the others, for Dolabella, ably defended by Hortensius and Caesar's cousin C. Cotta, was acquitted by the senatorial jurors, and Antonius escaped judgment by appealing to tribunes, who at this time at any rate were not in collusion with Caesar. These trials were chiefly of value because they brought Caesar into the public eye. Men knew who he was, for he had acquitted himself well and had prepared the way for a political career.

Caesar was concerned at this time with making friends rather than enemies, and there is curious evidence that he was successful, evidence that has not been sufficiently appreciated by modern scholars. He seems to have left Rome again in 76, and to have spent about three years in the east where his chief purpose was to study oratory with the great teacher Molo of Rhodes. He was recalled to Rome, probably early in the year 73, by the news that he had been elected to the pontificate in the place of his cousin, C. Aurelius Cotta, who had lately died. Every biography of Caesar discusses his election to the chief priesthood of the pontifices in 63, but none, so far as I know, has given special attention to his original inclusion in the college in 73. Yet that was a scarcely less important

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Cic. *Div. in Caec.* 24 and the scholiast on the passage, Ps. Ascon. pp. 193ff. St.; *Verr.* 2.1.97.

event. The great priestly colleges were made up of the most important men of the state. Young men of noble families often obtained the priesthoods early in their careers, and, after the bestowal of these distinctions, nearly always rose to the highest offices in the state. The election of priests, which for twenty years before Sulla had rested with the people, had been restored by Sulla to the priestly colleges which thus became exclusive clubs. Caesar could not have been appointed unless he had had the favor of at least a majority of the members of the college. In the Civil Wars and in the proscriptions of Sulla many of the earlier members of the college had perished, and new members were added to replace them and to fill up the increased quota of priests provided for by Sulla. Thus it was a college of Sullan nobles who by electing Caesar brought a young man of Marian background into the inner circle of the nobility. When they conferred upon Caesar the prestige of the pontificate, the pontifices had had as yet no real indication of the radical course that Caesar was later to follow. He had served under two Sullan officers; he had avoided open contact with the revolt of Lepidus and with the Sertorians in Spain, and up to this time he had taken no active part in the campaign, already far advanced, to restore the tribunate to its former powers.

Through two lists of pontifices from the late republic which, as I have tried to show,<sup>12</sup> are arranged in order of appointment, we now know the names of nine of the fourteen members of the college that elected Caesar. These men include several of the most conservative nobles in the senate, among them the *pontifex maximus* Q. Metellus Pius and Q. Lutatius Catulus, who from their fathers were hereditary enemies of Marius, and so might have been opposed to Caesar. But the college also included an Aemilius Lepidus who was probably identical with Caesar's relative Mamercus Aemilius Lepidus, one of the men who had pled for Caesar before Sulla, and Caesar's former commander P. Servilius Vatia. With Servilius as with other members of the college, Caesar later maintained relations of friendship which seem to go back to the seventies.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *AJPh* 63 (1942) 385ff. See the list of members, 411f.

<sup>13</sup> Servilius, like Caesar, supported the Manilian Law in 66. He was a rival candidate with Caesar for the office of *pontifex maximus* in 63. He held the censorship in 55, certainly with the consent of the "triumvirs" who controlled elections in that year. In the Civil War he was technically neutral, but his son, consul with Caesar in 48, was a prominent Caesarian. Another pontifex, M. Messalla, one of the *boni* in his consulship in 61 (cf. Cic. *Att.* 1.13-14), became a member of the board that ad-



It is a striking fact in the career of Caesar that not until after the distinction of a great priesthood had practically guaranteed his rise in political office did he begin the agitation against the Sullan constitution which was to occupy him for years to come—the effort to restore the tribunate, to redeem the memory of Marius from oblivion, to punish the men who had profited by the Sullan proscriptions, and to give back to his old comrades, the sons of the proscribed, their property and the right to hold office. This was Caesar's program for the next thirteen years while he was seeking to secure for himself the speediest possible rise in public office. He obtained his first elective office, the military tribunate, at the first *comitia* after his return, and in that office, which he held in 72 or 71, he entered vigorously into the campaign to restore the tribunes to their former status.

This campaign, which had formed part of Lepidus' revolutionary program, had become very active during Caesar's absence from Rome, and his cousin C. Cotta, whom he succeeded in the pontificate, had as consul in 75 under pressure sponsored a law which freed the tribunes from the restrictions that prevented them from holding higher offices. Now able men like Licinius Macer were holding the tribunate, and the forum was ringing with their eloquent pleas for the restoration of an ancient liberty and the liberation of the people from the domination of the oligarchy. At the same time there was a strong movement, also sponsored by tribunes and strengthened by scandals in the law courts, to give back to the knights the right of jury duty in the public courts. The supremacy of the Sullan senate was in danger of disappearing. It was a favorable moment for the young Caesar, who so far had made friends rather than enemies among the leaders, to begin his opposition to the Sullan constitution, and he found other nobles who either unwillingly like his cousin Cotta or willingly worked for the same ends.

For the opponents of the Sullan constitution the most potent ally was the eminent young general Pompey, already known like

ministered Caesar's land law in 59 (*ILS* 46). He was censor with Servilius in 55. His daughter seems to have married Caesar's nephew, Q. Pedius (cf. *Plin. Nat.* 35.21). D. Junius Silanus, consul 62, was the second husband of Servilia, the mother, by a previous marriage, of M. Brutus, and the half-sister of Cato. Caesar's relations with Servilia were for many years a subject of gossip at Rome. Silanus, who as consul-elect gave the first opinion on the punishment of the Catilinarians in 63, was so much influenced by Caesar's speech against the death penalty that he later modified his recommendations for execution (*Suet. Iul.* 14).

his model Alexander as "the Great." Since Caesar's relations with Pompey are important for an understanding of his contacts with other members of the nobility, it is desirable to consider Pompey's early associations with the Sullan senate. Although he rose to eminence under Sulla,<sup>14</sup> Pompey had never fitted into the Sullan system. Like his father, the man who, to quote Cicero,<sup>15</sup> was an object of hatred to the gods and the nobility, he had no definite party affiliations at the time of the revolution of Marius and Cinna; he seems for a time to have served under Cinna,<sup>16</sup> and then he joined Sulla in the nick of time, and placed the dictator under a heavy obligation by bringing an army with him. From Sulla Pompey wrested the great distinction of a triumph, the first ever bestowed on a private citizen. In the natural course of events he would then have sued for public office and made his career as a member of the senate, the central power in the Sullan system. But Pompey, who had far more political ability than Cicero's picture of him—or Mommsen's for that matter—would lead us to believe, boldly planned his future outside the Sullan senate. For long years as a Roman knight, a member of the class that had been the special object of Sulla's vengeance, he continued in a career that was unparalleled in Roman annals. Using the army that he had employed against Lepidus' forces, Pompey compelled the reluctant senate to give him a proconsular command in Spain. When the senate failed to send him adequate troops and equipment for the war, he wrote in terms of open menace: "If you do not send me help, then against my will—and I have warned you—my army and with it all the Spanish war will cross over from here into Italy."<sup>17</sup> And the senators, his enemy L. Lucullus leading the way, voted the funds and the supplies that Pompey demanded. By his peculiar position of power outside the senate he had already made enemies in the oligarchy, among them the two most important Sullan generals, Lucullus, whom Sulla had favored over Pompey in his will, and Q. Metellus Pius, the *pontifex maximus*, who was forced to accept the young Pompey as a colleague with equal power in the war against Sertorius. With them at this time, as certainly later, probably stood the foremost statesman in the senate, Q. Lutatius

<sup>14</sup> Plin. *Nat.* 7.96; cf. Luc. *Phars.* 7.307. On the influence of Sulla's example on Pompey in the Civil War see Professor v. Fritz's paper in this volume.

<sup>15</sup> Ap. Ascon. p. 79 Clark.

<sup>16</sup> Plu. *Pomp.* 5. Cf. Gelzer s.v. "Sergius" (22) *RE* 1694.

<sup>17</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 2.98.10 Maur.

Catulus, the man who had been given the privilege of immortalizing his name as the restorer of the Capitol. Even before returning from Spain Pompey had his agents in Rome who were working for the overthrow of the oligarchic system. Two of his supporters captured the consulship in 72.<sup>18</sup> Pompey was also interested in the restoration of the tribunate. If Sallust's version of Licinius Macer's oration as tribune in 73 is to be trusted—and Sallust's speeches often have a good basis—Pompey had already at that time indicated that he wished the tribunes to regain all their rights.<sup>19</sup> "As for me," Macer said, "I regard it as sure that Pompey . . . would rather be the chief man of the state with the consent of the people than the accomplice of the nobles in domination, and that in particular he will sponsor the restoration of the tribunate." Returning in 71 with his victorious army for a second triumph, Pompey exacted from the unwilling senate a vote that freed him from the Sullan laws governing the order and age of magistrates, and allowed him to sue for the consulship without having held any of the earlier offices in the *cursus*. *Quid tam novum, quid tam inauditum, quid tam inusitatum, quid tam singulare?*—Cicero asks in his outline of this remarkable career. Pompey made a pre-election deal with the rich and powerful Crassus, a middle of the road man, on whom the senators were building their hopes of frustrating Pompey's plans,<sup>20</sup> and the two men were elected. Their consulship marked the end of the most distinctive features of the Sullan constitution, for the two colleagues, by a law that bore both their names but is usually attributed to Pompey alone, restored the full powers of the tribunate. In their consulship the censorship was revived and the knights regained a share in jury duty.

It can hardly be doubted that Caesar, who had begun to agitate for the restoration of the tribunate before 70, was in complete sympathy with the reforms of Pompey's consulship. If I am right in dating in 70 a tribunitial law for which Caesar spoke from the rostra,<sup>21</sup> he may have been instrumental in securing the passage of one of the earliest—perhaps the very earliest—laws passed under the restored power of the tribunate. This law provided for the return

<sup>18</sup> Cn. Lentulus Clodianus and L. Gellius Publicola, who together served as censors when the office was restored in 70. Both men were Pompey's legates in the war against the pirates. See Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939) 66.

<sup>19</sup> Sall. *Hist.* 3.48.23M.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Plu. *Pomp.* 22; App. *B.C.* 1.121. See Gelzer s.v. "Licinius" (68) *RE* 307.

<sup>21</sup> On the date of this law (the *Lex Plotia*) see *CPH* 36 (1941) 121, note 32.

of the exiled adherents of Lepidus, among whom was Caesar's brother-in-law, the younger Cinna. Caesar must also have approved of the reorganization of lists of jurors in public courts embodied in a law proposed in the same year by his cousin, the youngest of the three Cotta brothers. Caesar was also associated with the two Pompeians who were chosen as censors in 70, one of whom had already attempted as consul two years before to punish the men who had profited from the Sullan proscriptions. It was probably out of deference to Caesar that these censors, when they expelled C. Antonius from the senate, included in their censure of him Caesar's charge that Antonius had despoiled a group of Greek allies.<sup>22</sup>

There is no evidence of any association of Caesar and Crassus at this time. Indeed Plutarch in his life of Crassus (7) indicates that the two men were originally enemies. There was reason for distrust on both sides. Crassus, whose father and brother had been murdered by agents of Marius and Cinna, would have looked askance at a man of Caesar's connections. Caesar must have realized that Crassus had been one of the chief profiteers in the Sullan proscriptions. Moreover Crassus and Pompey were steadily at variance in their consulship, and Caesar can hardly have maintained close relations with both of them.<sup>23</sup>

This was, as Syme has said,<sup>24</sup> the age of Pompey, and it was primarily against Pompey that early in the sixties the self-styled *boni* of the right, several of whom had long been at enmity with Pompey, formed a closely united faction that was to endure for

<sup>22</sup> Ascon. p. 84 C.; cf. Q. Cicero *Comm. Pet.* 8.

<sup>23</sup> The activities of the censors of 70 may have been one of the chief subjects of contention between Crassus and Pompey. The censors were both adherents of Pompey, and they staged a remarkable scene when he gave up his public horse (Plu. *Pomp.* 22). The sixty-four men whom they expelled from the senate were presumably Pompey's enemies. (On this censorship see P. Willems, *Le Sénat de la République romaine* 1 (Paris, 1878) 417-20; R. V. Cram *HSP* 51 [1940] 100.) The effort of many of the men ejected to secure reinstatement by obtaining public office led to very bitter election contests in the years following 70 (cf. Dio 36.38.2). I believe that Crassus, who was famous for the aid that he gave to candidates at elections (Plu. *Crass.* 7), agitated for these men. He certainly intervened to secure the election of C. Antonius to the consulship of 63 (Ascon. p. 83 C) and had perhaps supported the same man for the tribunate earlier. On the date of Antonius' tribunate see *CPh* 36 (1941) 121, note 32. Other men expelled, for instance P. Lentulus Crus and Q. Curius, appear later in the Catilinarian conspiracy, and had probably been associates of Crassus. The machinations of Crassus in the period 69-6, for which we have little direct evidence, deserve fuller investigation. He may have had some connection with the senators whose expulsion Cicero mentions in the *Pro Cluentio* 127-135.

<sup>24</sup> *JRS* 28 (1938) 116.

some twenty years. Originally Catulus was the leader of the faction; his associates included his brother-in-law, the eloquent Hortensius, the two Luculli, most members of the influential house of the Caecilii Metelli and C. Calpurnius Piso, consul of 67.<sup>25</sup> The group vigorously asserted the authority of the senate, already shaken by the legislation of Pompey's consulship. In the fierce contest for office they attempted, often with success, to secure the election of safe conservatives. The particular rallying point of the faction seems at first to have been the maintenance of L. Lucullus in the command against Mithridates—a responsibility that Pompey was eager to have transferred to himself.

In place of the army that was now disbanded Pompey called to his aid a group of tribunes who with their fully restored powers provided once more an effective instrument for revolutionary changes in the state. As a result of tribunitial attacks, first Asia, then Cilicia and Bithynia were wrested from Lucullus, and the way was prepared for Pompey to succeed him. This was a popular movement, and, though Pompey himself remained in the background, he was recognized as a *popularis*. That fact is clear not only from letters of Cicero in which Pompey is called *popularis* but from the revealing advice that Quintus Cicero gives his brother on his campaign for the consulship: "We must convince the nobles that we have always agreed with the *optimates* about public affairs, that we have been in no sense *populares*; if ever we appear to have made speeches in a popular manner, we have done so in order to win the favor of Cn. Pompeius."<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> On the formation of rival movements in politics after the year 70 see Sall. *Catil.* 38–9, cf. 37. Catulus is the leader of the *optimates* who is most often mentioned. For his attitude under the domination of Pompey see Cic. *Off.* 1.76; *Fam.* 9.15.3. The composition of the group, frequently referred to as *pauci*, can be in part determined from Asconius' list of five nobles who in 65 gave testimony against Pompey's tribune of 67, C. Cornelius. Cf. Ascon. *In Corn.* p. 60 C: Dixerunt in eum infesti testimonia principes civitatis qui plurimum in senatu poterant Q. Hortensius, Q. Catulus, Q. Metellus Pius, M. Lucullus, M'. Lepidus. The text of Asconius's commentary on the *Pro Cornelio* of Cicero provides further evidence for the existence of a faction of oligarchs (*pauci*). Among other opponents of Pompey was Q. Metellus Creticus, with whom probably stood his two brothers, the consul of 68 who died in office and the praetor of 69. Two other members of the same family were supporters of Pompey—Q. Metellus Celer and Q. Metellus Nepos. They were the half-brothers of Pompey's wife Mucia.

<sup>26</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 5. The speeches referred to are mentioned in 51. Iam urbanam illam multitudinem et eorum studia qui contiones tenent adeptus es in Pompeio ornando, Manili causa recipienda, Cornelio defendendo. For Pompey as a *popularis* see Cicero's letters of 60, *Att.* 1.19.4 and 8; 1.20.2; 2.1.6. Cf. Plu. *Pomp.* 22.

There was much less close organization among the *populares* than among the *optimates*, for Crassus, who was opposed both to Pompey and to the most conservative *optimates*, also had tribunes to propose rival laws. For a time Pompey was stronger. In addition to the young plebeians who as tribunes carried through his legislation, Pompey had powerful patrician adherents: Caesar and the notorious P. Clodius Pulcher who was stirring up mutiny in the war-weary army of Lucullus. Caesar, after returning from his quaestorship in Further Spain, was back in Rome early in 67 to aid Pompey in the battle that marked the climax of the attacks on the authority of the senate. The struggle came over the tribune Gabinius' bill to give Pompey the extraordinary command against the pirates. The opposition of the right, led by Catulus and the consul Piso, carried most of the senate with them in the fight against the bill. Caesar was, we are told, the only prominent senator who ventured to support the bill, and he doubtless had an active part in the stormy meeting of the tribal assembly at which the bill was passed. Again in the following year Caesar was one of the supporters of the bill of Manilius to transfer the command against Mithridates from Lucullus to Pompey.<sup>27</sup> By this time the success of the pirate war, in which many of the nobles had served as Pompey's legates, had brought a number of senators to Pompey's side, among them Servilius Vatia and other *consulares*, and also the orator Cicero, who with Caesar spoke from the rostra in favor of the bill. We have no evidence of Caesar's attitude toward the legislation of another of Pompey's tribunes, C. Cornelius, who in 67 attacked the senate in several bills, one of which was directed against the senate's practice of granting dispensations from the law to favorites of the oligarchy. But Cornelius' enemies—Catulus, Piso, M. Lucullus,—were Caesar's enemies, and we can hardly doubt that Caesar was one of Cornelius' backers. I have elsewhere suggested that it was as a result of Cornelius' legislation that Caesar himself secured a dispensation from the laws which enabled him to reach subsequent offices two years before the legal age.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Caesar's support of the Gabinian Law is attested only by Plutarch, *Pomp.* 25, and Zonaras 10.3, where the notice comes from Plutarch; his support of the Manilian Law only by Dio 36.43.2-4. Strasburger, *Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte* (Munich, 1938) 98ff., suggests that the two reports may be a doublet; and that Caesar may have been active in the agitation for only one of the two laws. But Cicero in the Fourth Catiline (9) recognizes the fact that Caesar had for some time followed the *via popularis*, and support of both bills would have been consistent with such a course.

<sup>28</sup> *CPh* 36 (1941) 125ff.

While he was supporting Pompey's popular legislation, Caesar was also pursuing on his own account policies that confirmed his association with the popular movement. He gave from the rostra funeral orations for his wife Cornelia and his aunt Julia, and he had in Cornelia's father Cinna, and Julia's husband Marius abundant material to revive the people's interest in the great *populares* whom many of them could remember. At Julia's funeral Caesar even ventured to exhibit the images of Marius which Sulla had consigned to oblivion. In his aedileship he restored to the Capitol the gleaming trophies of Marius. These acts were applauded by the populace but bitterly opposed by the extreme right, which included Catulus and Metellus Pius, Caesar's pontifical colleagues, sons of two of Marius's bitterest enemies. Caesar was also a leader in the attempt to punish the profiteers and murderers who had taken part in the Sullan terror, defending the victims in the law courts<sup>29</sup> and, as president of the murder court in 64, condemning the agents. He used every opportunity to cultivate the masses, spending large sums as curator of the Via Appia on the restoration of the great highway, and giving as aedile magnificent games and gladiatorial shows of such size that the senate, fearing that he would use the gladiators for armed violence, passed a motion limiting the number of gladiators to be used in such shows (Suet. *Iul.* 10).

Throughout the period Caesar was winning friends in his own dwindling patrician class.<sup>30</sup> Caesar's pride in his birth is clearly indicated by the speech at Julia's funeral in which he told the people of the divine and kingly ancestry of the Julian house. His patrician friends included his distant cousin L. Julius Caesar, consul of 64, later his legate in the Gallic and Civil Wars, and members of the old houses of the Aemilii, Valerii, Corneli, and Claudii.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> His oration *Pro Decio Samnile* was probably of this type. Cf. Cic. *Clu.* 161.

<sup>30</sup> Probably before he went to Spain in 69 Caesar married Pompeia, who was not a relative of Pompey the Great. She was a granddaughter of Q. Pompeius Rufus, the consul of 88 who was murdered, reportedly by agents of Pompey's father. Her maternal grandfather was Sulla. Political associations probably explain this curious marriage into the family of Sulla. It is noteworthy that Pompeia's brother seems to have been a Caesarian. As tribune of 52 he was active with the historian Sallust against Milo (see Ascon. *In Milon. passim*), and like Sallust was later condemned and exiled. Cf. Willems, *op. cit.* 1.522.

<sup>31</sup> See Syme, *The Roman Revolution* 68-70. Among Caesar's patrician adherents were his pontifical colleagues M. Valerius Messalla (see note 13) and M. Aemilius Lepidus, the future triumvir, who was made a pontifex about 62 (*AJPh* 63.392). P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who joined Pompey in the Civil War, was brought into the pontificate through Caesar (Caes. *B.C.* 1.22.4). Prominent among Caesar's sup-

The absence of Pompey during the years 67 to 62—a period when the influence of Catulus' faction grew<sup>32</sup>—led Caesar, who in this period won the aedileship and the praetorship, to seek friends also among the plebeian nobility, and he seems to have made many. The most important was Crassus, who was continuing his opposition both to Pompey and to the coterie of Catulus and Lucullus, and was cultivating both senate and people.<sup>33</sup> It is of some importance to determine when Caesar's alliance with Crassus began and how far it went. The general view is that as early as 66 Caesar entered into a close compact with Crassus and that the two men combined in a number of schemes that were designed to undermine the power of Pompey.

Crassus was certainly plotting against Pompey. He was the leading spirit in the conspiracy of late 66, often called the first conspiracy of Catiline because Catiline was Crassus' agent at the time. The design was to murder the consuls of 65, replace them by their rivals, whose election had been invalidated, and make Crassus dictator. According to enemies of Caesar, whom Suetonius quotes,<sup>34</sup> Caesar was in the plot and was to have been Crassus' master of horse. The plot failed but Crassus was strong enough in the senate to secure a special command in Spain for one of his

porters in the Civil War were other patricians whose associations may go back to an earlier period—Q. Fabius Maximus, P. Cornelius Dolabella, and Ti. Claudius Nero. Caesar's relations with the patrician Servilia, mother of M. Brutus, a woman of great political influence, continued for many years.

<sup>32</sup> Sall. *Catil.* 39.1. Sed postquam Cn. Pompeius ad bellum maritimum atque Mithridaticum missus est, plebis opes imminutae, paucorum potentia crevit.

<sup>33</sup> On Crassus as a middle of the road man see Dio 37.56.5; 39.30.2; Plu. *Crass.* 7. On his course in this period see note 23. Cicero in his oration for Cornelius (cf. Ascon. p. 76 C) commented on Crassus' inability to protect the tribunate that he had restored. Yet Crassus seems to have had his tribunes. One of them was perhaps L. Roscius Otho whose bill of 67 provided for special seats for Crassus' favorites, the knights, at the theatre. Roscius opposed the Gabinian Law for Pompey's command. The tribune of 66, Manilius, before supporting Pompey, had offered his services to Crassus. Cf. Dio 36.42.3 as interpreted by Gelzer s.v. "Licinius" (68) *RE* 308.

<sup>34</sup> Suetonius, *Iul.* 9, gives as the source of the report Tanusius Geminus in Historia, Marcus Bibulus in edictis, C. Curio pater in orationibus. Tanusius Geminus (cf. Strasburger, *op. cit.* 107f.) probably obtained his report from Bibulus and from Curio, who after 60 was an enemy of Caesar. As Strasburger also notes, Asconius, p. 83 C, quotes Cicero, *De consiliis suis*, for the statement that Crassus was the *author* of this conspiracy. In my review of Strasburger, *CPh* 36 (1941) 413f., I did not give due weight to the author's argument. Although I do not agree with him on the early relations between Caesar and Pompey (see note 27) I am now convinced as a result of further study of the sources that he is in general right in his interpretation of Caesar's relations with Crassus.



agents, Cn. Piso. Crassus' purpose, it was said, was to have Piso raise a force against Pompey. When Piso was murdered in Spain, it was asserted that he had been killed by Pompey's agents. Again Suetonius quotes hostile sources for Caesar's association with Crassus' plans.<sup>35</sup> In 65 Crassus made an unsuccessful attempt to have himself appointed to the task of incorporating Egypt into Roman territory. Once more Suetonius, who in this case does not name his source, is the only authority for Caesar's association with this scheme,—in fact Suetonius says that it was Caesar, not Crassus, who was trying to secure the Egyptian appointment.<sup>36</sup> In late 64 Crassus backed the tribune Rullus who proposed the creation of an overseas land commission that would have cut into Pompey's power. In this case no ancient author connects Caesar with the plan, though modern authorities with the exception of Strasburger, who has pointed out the uncertainty of all this evidence for Caesar's combinations with Crassus,<sup>37</sup> have been practically unanimous in seeing Caesar's hand in the bill.

Was Caesar double-crossing Pompey? I am inclined to doubt it. As Strasburger has pointed out, the reports all come from Suetonius who gives us the propaganda of the fifties that was designed to drive a wedge between Caesar and Pompey. Not a word on the subject comes from the confidential letters of Cicero who must have been familiar with the facts. A German, writing in an atmosphere permeated by Nazi propaganda, has seen the true nature of these reports, which have had more influence on the modern view of Caesar than they seem to have obtained among his contemporaries. Caesar was a skillful and adroit politician, but he had more loyalty and good faith than we have been inclined to believe.<sup>38</sup> In politics as in personal relations he was true to his friends. It is significant that Pompey, whose agents kept him well informed about affairs in Rome, seems to have trusted Caesar. Otherwise Caesar would hardly have been in such close relationship with Pompey's representatives in the years 63–2.

<sup>35</sup> Suetonius, *ibid.*, quotes Curio again and M. Actorius Naso who is again named in *Iul.* 52 as a source of calumnies against Caesar.

<sup>36</sup> *Iul.* 11. Caesar, who was curule aedile in this year, had not advanced far enough in the cursus to justify such an appointment. For Crassus and the Egyptian question see *Plu. Crass.* 13; cf. *Cic. Leg. agr.* 1.1; 2.41–44.

<sup>37</sup> Crassus is not named by any ancient authority, but from *Cic. Leg. agr.* 2.44 it is clear that Rullus' backer is identical with the author of the plan to annex Egypt in 65.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Syme, *op. cit.* 70.

But Roman political associations were infinitely complex, and there can be no doubt that at least as early as the year 64 Caesar had political relations with Crassus. The explanation is probably to be found in Caesar's steadily mounting debts and in Crassus' well known readiness to secure allies by generous loans. The first sure sign of the new alliance can be seen in 64 when Caesar, as president of the murder court, exonerated Crassus' adherent Catiline, who had been one of the most notorious murderers of the Sullan terror. When in the consular elections of that year the extreme right combined with the moderate elements to support the new man Cicero, Caesar united with Crassus in an unsuccessful attempt to oppose Cicero and to secure the election of Catiline.<sup>39</sup> We do not know how closely Caesar maintained his connections with Crassus and Catiline in the year 63. We know only that in the investigation of the Catilinarian conspiracy Cicero, while covertly charging Crassus with complicity, shielded Caesar from the charges of Catulus and Piso. At the famous senatorial meeting on the Nones of December, when the fate of the Catilinarians was decided, Crassus and Caesar did not act together. Crassus, unwilling either to offend the conservatives or to vote for the execution of citizens without trial, stayed away from the meeting, while Caesar attended and made an eloquent speech against exacting the death penalty under the senatorial decree for martial law. In the oration delivered on that occasion Cicero (*In Catil.* 4.9-10), though he avoids naming Crassus, refers by innuendo to his absence and speaks of Caesar's motion as a "guarantee of his lasting interest in the public weal. We have learned the difference between the frivolity of the public speaker and the truly 'popular' spirit that takes counsel for the welfare of the state."

Cicero's respectful attitude toward Caesar may be partly explained by the great effect that Caesar's speech had produced. As a result of it many senators, including Cicero's brother and the consul-elect Silanus, who had presented the original motion for the death penalty, modified their earlier votes. But another reason for Cicero's attitude was his realization of Caesar's close connection with Pompey whom the orator was trying to conciliate. Caesar's attachment to Pompey's interests is clearly indicated by the support he gave to Metellus Nepos, the tribune who brought in the bill that Pompey be recalled to set the state in order.

<sup>39</sup> Here we have the excellent testimony of Asconius, p. 83 C.

That the attitude of Pompey was like that of Caesar and Nepos is, I believe, indicated by a passage in Cicero's famous letter to Pompey written in 62 (*Fam.* 5.7.1) "I want you to know that your old enemies who are now your new friends have received a heavy blow from your letter, and that they lie prostrate, cast down from high hopes." Cicero is speaking of a letter that Pompey wrote to the senate. The passage is misunderstood by the commentators who usually identify Pompey's old enemies with the *populares*.<sup>40</sup> But they were old friends of Pompey. Cicero is referring to the *optimates* whom Pompey, with a realization of the difficulties he would encounter on his return, had probably been trying to placate. They were presumably disappointed because to them, as in the personal letter he had sent to Cicero, Pompey had doubtless been non-committal in his reference to the execution of the Catilinarians.

To return to the year 63, it is significant for the relations of Caesar and Pompey that in that year Caesar prosecuted Pompey's foe, C. Piso, the consul of 67,<sup>41</sup> and that much of Caesar's activity in that year was carried out in coöperation with one of Pompey's tribunes T. Labienus, later Caesar's ablest legate in Gaul, a man whose desertion to Pompey at the beginning of the Civil War Syme has convincingly explained by Labienus' Picene origin.<sup>42</sup> Labienus seems to have been one of Pompey's numerous Picene clients. In his tribunate he showed his loyalty by proposing special honors for Pompey. Caesar supported the proposal, and found in Labienus a tool for several other measures. Thus Labienus proposed an unsuccessful bill that was to give back to Caesar's old associates, the sons of the proscribed, the right to hold office. He prosecuted Rabirius for treason in an ancient form of trial in which Caesar and his cousin L. Caesar served as judges. This abortive trial was an outright attack on the authority of the senate and the validity of action under the extreme senatorial decree of martial law. More

<sup>40</sup> Some commentators, for instance How, *Cicero, Select Letters* (Oxford, 1926) 2.62, think that the passage refers not to the *populares* in general but to Caesar and Crassus in particular.

<sup>41</sup> Sall. *Catil.* 49. Cf. Cic. *Flacc.* 98. Caesar appeared in this trial as the protector of the Transpadani for whose citizenship he had previously agitated (Suet. *Iul.* 8, cf. 9). As censor in 65 Crassus had tried to enroll the Transpadani as citizens and had broken with his colleague Catulus on the issue. But Pompey was also interested in the Transpadani who had gained Latin rights through his father. See Syme, *JRS* 27 (1938) 117; *The Roman Revolution* 74.

<sup>42</sup> *JRS* 27 (1938) 113-125.

important because it was successful was Labienus' bill to restore to the people the right of electing public priests.<sup>43</sup> This was the only prerogative bestowed on the nobility by Sulla which had not been revoked. The question was of special interest at the time, for the *pontifex maximus* Metellus Pius had lately died and a successor had to be elected among the pontifices. Catulus and Caesar were the chief contestants, and Caesar's support of Labienus' bill contributed to his success in winning this powerful semi-magisterial priesthood which usually went to an elder statesman. The nobility of the right rallied to Catulus' side, but other candidates split the opposition, and Caesar appears to have had unlimited funds for bribery.

Caesar's victory in this election over the man who had become a symbol of senatorial prestige made him a major figure in Roman politics. In the same year he won the praetorship. In that office early in 62 he presented a bill to remove Catulus' name from the Capitol and to make Pompey the restorer of the temple.<sup>44</sup> The bill was defeated, as was also Metellus Nepos' bill to recall Pompey to save the state. The conservative nobility now had a new leader in the young Cato, a man who had won his spurs by his speech for the death penalty at the senatorial meeting on the Catilinarians. Nepos and, according to Suetonius, Caesar also, who was agitating with him for Pompey's recall, were suspended from office. Nepos fled to Pompey, but Caesar, who was not ready for open revolution, stayed in Rome, placated the senate, and obtained reinstatement. He was strong enough in the senate to overcome the attacks of his enemies who produced informers to show that Caesar had been involved in the Catilinarian conspiracy.

It was to a political scene of violent factional strife that Pompey returned from his eastern victories early in 61. Just before he came back occurred the Bona Dea scandal in which his old agent Clodius in an intrigue with Caesar's wife was detected in the secret gathering of women held to celebrate the mysteries of the goddess in Caesar's house. Caesar divorced his wife, but, though the scandal was very much his concern as *pontifex maximus*, he shielded Clodius by declaring that he "knew nothing." In the face of the attacks of the *optimates* on this violation of the state religion Pompey also kept hands off in the affair, but Crassus bought the jury and saved

<sup>43</sup> On this bill see *CPh* 37 (1942) 421ff.

<sup>44</sup> Dio 37.44. Suetonius, *Iul.* 15, mentions the bill but does not name Pompey.

Clodius from conviction. Pompey and Crassus still hated each other but they seem to have had a common interest in Clodius and in Caesar. They also had common enemies in the senatorial right who were blocking the confirmation of Pompey's settlements in the east and the bonus for his soldiers, and were at the same time blocking Crassus' arrangements with the publicans in Asia. Both Pompey and Crassus made overtures to the powerful coalition of the right. Pompey in his first public speech early in 61 talked "like a true aristocrat" and asserted—with manifest falsehood—that he had always considered the authority of the senate of paramount importance in the state.<sup>46</sup> Crassus coöperated with Lucullus in the attempt to prevent the confirmation of Pompey's acts.<sup>46</sup>

By this time Caesar was recognized by the coalition of the right not simply as an adherent of Pompey but as a dangerous enemy on his own account. When Crassus had paid his debts,<sup>47</sup> he went off in May or June 61 to his governorship of Further Spain, and he was expected to return to present himself at the consular elections of 60. The *optimates*, foreseeing his election, carried in the senate a motion which gave to the consuls of 59 the profitless and inglorious task of overseeing forests and pasture lands—poor substitutes for rich provinces.<sup>48</sup> When Caesar, after victories in Lusitania, came back in June of 60, Cato, who now that Catulus had died was the leader of the *optimates*, was strong enough in the senate to force Caesar to choose between the triumph that had been voted and immediate candidacy for the consulship. Caesar decided to relinquish the triumph, and entered the city at once to present himself for the consulship. Pompey and Crassus, though they were still enemies, both supported Caesar at the polls,<sup>49</sup> but it is the connec-

<sup>46</sup> Cic. *Att.* 1.14.2 and 6. Pompey had recently divorced his wife Mucia (a fact which led to strained relations with her half-brothers Metellus Celer and Metellus Nepos). According to Plutarch (*Pomp.* 44; *Cato Min.* 30) Pompey wished to marry one of Cato's nieces, but Cato resisted the overtures. See Eduard Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin, 1919) 45f.

<sup>46</sup> App. *B.C.* 2.9; Plut. *Luc.* 42; cf. Dio 37.54.3.

<sup>47</sup> Plutarch (*Crass.* 7; *Caes.* 11) is the only writer who names Crassus as the person who satisfied Caesar's creditors. On Caesar's debts at this time see Suet. *Iul.* 18; App. *B.C.* 2.8.

<sup>48</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 19. See Meyer, *op. cit.* 58.

<sup>49</sup> Dio, 37.54.3, says that Pompey and Crassus, though they were manipulating factions against each other (*ἀντιπολιτικά*), both supported Caesar. According to Appian (*B.C.* 2.9–10), Plutarch (*Caes.* 13, *Crass.* 14, *Pomp.* 47) and Livy (*Per.* 103) the formation of the triumvirate preceded the election of Caesar. This is contrary to the evidence of Cicero, *Att.* 2.3.3, written in December 60.

tion with Pompey that is emphasized in Cicero's letters. Cicero thinks of Pompey and Caesar together as *populares*, and in a letter to Atticus (2.1.6) written just before Caesar's return expresses the hope that he can make them both better men—that is lead them to join the *boni*. Cicero is giving a humorous explanation of his own recent intimacy with Pompey. His purpose, he says, is "not to withdraw from my own optimate policy but to make Pompey a better man and lead him to lay aside his popular frivolity," and this, he feels, would be a contribution to public welfare. "But," he continues, "if I also make Caesar—whose winds are marvelously fair—a better man, shall I be such an obstacle to the welfare of the state?" The connection with Pompey is also suggested by the fact that the candidate with whom Caesar made a pre-election deal, Luceius, was Pompey's closest confidant in the senate. The two candidates engaged in wholesale bribery, but the *optimates*, with the full agreement of Cato, also bribed so extensively that, though Caesar was elected, Luceius yielded at the polls to the optimate candidate M. Calpurnius Bibulus.

Facing a consulship in which his colleague was the representative of the faction which controlled the senate, Caesar needed a strong coalition to combat that faction and he proceeded to form one: the so-called triumvirate. He reconciled the enemies Pompey and Crassus,<sup>50</sup> both of whom had already suffered defeats from the same group. Thus Caesar created a new faction of the left that was as closely knit as the faction on the right which was made up of nobles who had worked together for years. The new faction followed the tradition of Roman politics in that it was essentially personal in character, formed, Suetonius (*Iul.* 19) says, "in order that nothing might be done in the state that was contrary to the wishes of any one of the three." Since, in spite of the fact that a number of nobles hastened to curry favor with the new leaders, the opposition controlled the decisions of the senate, the new coalition was from the first determined to seek its ends from the people. Crassus, who had labored all his life to placate senate and people alike, had thrown in his lot with the *populares* Pompey and Caesar. It is as *populares* that the leaders of the new coalition were recognized in the year 59.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup> The go-between used by Caesar was the Gaditane L. Cornelius Balbus who had won his citizenship in Pompey's Spanish campaign and had later been Caesar's *praefectus fabrum* in Spain.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Cic. *Att.* 2.19.2; 2.20.4.

Through this coalition Caesar obtained a long-term appointment to a province which controlled the approaches to Italy; he secured also the opportunity to raise a great army which after many victories was to provide him with means of securing personal domination. Had this been his design throughout his entire struggle with the oligarchs? One may reasonably doubt it, for in that case he would surely have sought to prepare himself for military leadership by serving, like many of his contemporaries, as legate under another general—Pompey, for instance. Instead Caesar had remained in the city, reducing to such short periods his absences as quaestor and praetorian governor of Further Spain that in both cases he was criticized for leaving the province too soon. Only in the brief Lusitanian campaign of 61–60 had he had experience as a general. He had exercised his talents in politics, and there he was a tried and tested veteran. From his career we can make no more definite conclusion about his original purpose than that he was determined to rise as speedily as possible in the Roman sequence of offices. What of the purpose that he states in the *Bellum Civile*—*ut se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret*? At the time when he wrote those words Caesar had violated the sanctity of a tribune, the great symbol of the people's sovereignty, and had made a travesty of the popular assemblies. He was not interested in the liberty of the people. But it is noteworthy that he mentions himself first, and here we have a genuine statement of his aims. He had struggled for years against a faction of the oligarchy to assert his own personal freedom of action.

We have followed the political associations of Caesar to the fateful consulship of Metellus. We have seen him as a young man, closely associated in background with the Marians, making the compromises necessary to permit him to rise under the Sullan system to the pontificate which brought him into the inner circle of the nobility. We have seen him then join the agitators for the restoration of the tribunate and make common cause with Pompey, the destroyer of the Sullan constitution. We have found him campaigning with Pompey's popular tribunes for the extraordinary commands sought by Pompey, and, after Pompey's departure, working with his agents in the city. We have seen him associated with other groups in Rome—representatives of the patricians, some of his pontifical colleagues, various other nobles, notably Crassus, whose generous loans freed him from his creditors. But the general

view that Caesar connived with Crassus to undermine Pompey's power is, I have argued, based on false charges of ancient propagandists. Caesar had kept faith with Pompey by whom he had been, in Cicero's words, nurtured and increased in stature and armed.<sup>52</sup> It was through association with Pompey that Caesar acquired the enmity of the group of conservatives led by Catulus, who, in opposition to Pompey's attacks on the senate, organized a closely knit faction early in the sixties. To combat that group of *optimates* Caesar reconciled Crassus and Pompey in 60 and formed a rival faction of *populares*. A decade later when Caesar, depending on an army that was strong and loyal after great victories, threatened the state, Pompey combined against him with the new leaders of Catulus' old circle. There was truth in the charge that Caesar makes at the beginning of the *Bellum Civile*: "For Pompey had become reconciled to their common enemies whose hostility Caesar had incurred in the time of their relationship." Caesar, who had engineered the coalition of 60, was now confronted by a new coalition against which he could no longer struggle by political methods. And so, to overcome his enemies, he had recourse to arms. "They would have it so," Pollio quotes Caesar as saying, "After my great achievement, I, Gaius Caesar, should have been condemned if I had not appealed to my army."

<sup>52</sup> Cic. *Att.* 8.3.3. Omitto illa vetera quod istum in rem publicam ille aluit, auxit, armavit.